CPLR 103(c): Motion Commenced by Affadavit But Served Upon Other Parties After Action Had Been Finalized, Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 3 Volume 44, January 1970, Number 3 Article 7 
December 2012 
CPLR 103(c): Motion Commenced by Affadavit But Served Upon 
Other Parties After Action Had Been Finalized, Dismissed for Lack 
of Jurisdiction 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1970) "CPLR 103(c): Motion Commenced by Affadavit But Served Upon Other 
Parties After Action Had Been Finalized, Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 
44 : No. 3 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss3/7 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
plishes its basic purpose, viz., to key the practitioner to significant de-
velopments in the procedural law of New York.
The Table of Contents is designed to direct the reader to those
specific areas of procedural law which may be of importance to him.
The various sections of the CPLR which are specifically treated in the
cases are listed under their respective titles.
ApTICLE 1- SHORT TrrLE; APPLICABILITY AND DFXINInONS
CPLR 103(c): Motion commenced by affidavit but served upon other
parties after action had been finalized, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Although CPLR 103(c) directs that a civil proceeding "shall not
be dismissed solely because it is not brought in the proper form" and
that a court "shall make whatever order is required for its proper
prosecution," these provisions are naturally conditioned upon the
court's having obtained jurisdiction over the parties.1 In Kreindler v.
Irving Trust Co.,2 decided by the supreme court, a motion for attor-
ney's fees was dismissed on the ground that, since the initial action
had been finalized, jurisdiction to entertain the motion, without the
commencement of a new action, was lacking. This determination was
arrived at even though the motion, commenced by affidavit, was served
upon the other parties and answering affidavits were submitted in
response thereto. Moreover, the court opined that "even assuming
that the answering affidavits were an appearance, the court lacks
jurisdiction of an action or special proceeding begun by inappropriate
process and this jurisdictional defect could not be waived by an
appearance." 3
Under the facts present in this case, the court's statement regarding
waiver by appearance is questionable. CPLR 820(b) clearly establishes
that any objection regarding the sufficiency of process is waived by a
general appearance. 4 However, even if jurisdiction could not have
been obtained through an "appearance," it would have been possible
for the court to exercise it by construing CPLR 103(c) in a liberal
manner.
An apt illustration of this approach appears in City Commission
on Human Rights v. Regal Gardens, Inc.5 The plaintiff there had
1 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 103, supp. commentary 12 (1969); 1 WK&M 103.08 (1969).
2 60 Misc. 2d 441, 803 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1969).
3 Id. at 442, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 423. The court, however, did not in fact make this
assumption. See id.
4 See In re Dell, 56 Misc. 2d 1017, 290 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Family Ct. Monroe County 1968).
553 Misc. 2d 318, 278 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967). See The
Quarterly Survey, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 283, 309 (1967).
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applied for a temporary injunction with an order to show cause sup-
ported by an affidavit instead of properly commencing a special pro-
ceeding. CPLR 304 provides that special proceedings are commenced
and jurisdiction acquired by service of a notice of petition or an order
to show cause. Although the Regal Gardens court held that the order
to show cause ostensibly met the requirement of CPLR 304, the court
added:
However that may be, we are directed by CPLR 103 [subd. (c)],
where the parties are before the court, not to dismiss solely because
the proceeding "is not brought in the proper form, but the court
shall make whatever order is required for its proper prosecution."
Hence, the affidavit in this case may be deemed a petition for the
purposes of this proceeding. 6
Thus it should be recognized that although the dismissal in
Kreindler may be supported by a prior decision of the appellate divi-
sion wherein it was held that jurisdiction is not obtained where a
special proceeding is commenced by service of a petition instead of a
notice of petition or order to show cause,7 it would also be possible,
by utilizing the rationale of Regal Gardens, to view the affidavit in
Kreindler as a petition. Since at the time the affidavit was served, it had
the same effect as a notice of petition, should not the court have
recognized that jurisdiction was thereby acquired? If it were recognized
that jurisdiction did exist, the court would then have been required
to correct any defects of form pursuant to CPLR 103(c). As indicated
above, this could have been accomplished by viewing the affidavit
as a petition and changing the form of the proceeding from a special
proceeding to an action. The only crucial distinction between a motion
and a special proceeding is the requirement that the latter must be
commenced by obtaining jurisdiction while the former is proper if the
jurisdiction has previously been obtained in the action or special
proceeding in which it is made.8 With this in mind, when a motion is
made in a manner that would satisfy jurisdictional requirements if a
special proceeding were involved, is there any real distinction remain-
ing which should require a dismissal in one instance and full adjudica-
tion in the other?
Finally, the question arises as to whether jurisdiction should really
be lost for purposes of moving for counsel fees merely because the
6 53 Misc. 2d at 320, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
7 New York State Restaurant Ass'n, Inc. v. Board of Standards and Appeals, 19 App.
Div. 2d 912, 244 N.Y.S.2d 15 (3d Dep't 1963).
8 WK&M 103.06 (1969).
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action was "finalized." There are instances when a court retains juris-
diction for specific purposes even though it has rendered a "final''
judgment. CPLR 4404, for example, permits post-trial motions for
judgment and/or a new trial. And New York courts have long retained
jurisdiction for matters incidental to the judgment in matrimonial
actions.9
It must be concluded that to subject both the movants and the
state to the costs rising from a completely new action seems unnecessary
and unfortunate in light of the alternatives available to the court.
ARnIL 2 - LIMITATIONS OF T=I
CPLR 203(b): Section's tolling provisions not rendered inoperative
by General Municipal Law section 50-i.
Prior to the amendment of the General Municipal Law in 1959,
the tolling provisions pertaining to municipal tort liability were so
varied as to render unclear exactly what tolls a plaintiff was entitled
to invoke. 10
For purposes of uniformity and clarity, the Legislature enacted
section 50-i of the General Municipal Law, which extends the period
within which an action must be brought against municipalities" to
one year and ninety days. The section further provides that this time
limitation "shall be applicable notwithstanding any inconsistent pro-
visions of law .... ,12 The legislative intent behind the enactment of
the section was not only to extend the time limitation for actions
within its scope but also to render inoperative the various tolls which
were available under CPA 24 (now CPLR 204(a)), as that section
applied to actions against municipalities.' 3 It must be remembered,
however, that section 50-i is a statute of limitations, and computation
of the time period under it should otherwise follow applicable law.14
A 1968 case, Family Bargain Centers, Inc. v. Village of Herkimer,5
seemingly violated this principle by holding that section 50-i obviates
9 See, e.g., Fox v. Fox, 263 N.Y. 68, 188 N.E. 160 (1933); Freund v. Burns, 268 App.
Div. 989, 51 N.Y.S.2d 642 (2d Dep't 1944).
10 McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 1967 Survey of New York Law, 19 SYRACUSE L. REv.
501, 508 (1967).
11.The word "municipalities" is here employed in its broadest sense. Section 50-i
encompasses actions against a "city, country, town, village, fire district or school district"
12 N.Y. GEN. Mumic. LAwv § 50-i (2) (McKinney 1965).
13 Joiner v. City of New York, 26 App. Div. 2d 840, 274 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep't 1966).
14 McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 1968 Survey of New York Law, 20 SYRAcusE L. REv.
449, 455 (1968).
1556 Misc. 2d 768, 290 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1968). See also
McLaughlin, supra note 14, at 455; 7B McKNrEY's CPLR 203, supp. commentary 34
(1965); 1 wKM 20.13 (1969).
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